THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AS SEEN THROUGH
ITS CASE LAW*
MAuRiCE LAGRANG4

It is common knowledge that a "Convention relating to certain common institutions," signed and ratified at the same time as the Treaties of Rome, has entrusted
to a single Court of Justice the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice that each of the
three treaties-European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), European Economic
Community (E.E.C), and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)-has
established. The same solution has been adopted in respect of the Assembly, which
is a common organ of the three Communities. It has, however, been clearly provided that the single Court exercise its jurisdiction in accord with the procedure
laid down by each of the three treaties-and depending on whether a claim is introduced within the framework of one or the other of the three instruments. The
Treaties of Rome have not modified the E.G.S.C. Treaty in this respect; on the
contrary, article 232 of the Treaty establishing the E.E.C. explicitly states that:
The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect those of the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, in particular in regard to the rights and obligations
of Member States, the powers of the institutions of the said Community and the rules laid
down by the said Treaty for the functioning of the common market for coal and steel.
The importance of the part played under these circumstances by the Court in its
capacity of sole judge and the difficulties resulting therefrom become at once apparent.
The origin of these difficulties does not lie so much in the few differences that the
treaties have introduced in respect to the submission of claims and to procedure
(the same situation is rather frequent in municipal law, where the same judge may
have to exercise different types of authority and apply different rules of procedure);
t4hy stem -rather from some basic'divergences in the very conception of the Common
Market* and 'in the economic rules on competition, discrimination, and so forth.
The question arises whether the Court should undertake the interpretation of each
Treaty in its. original context, or whether it should, as far as the texts authorize it,
take an approach to the problem that would permit an identical solution of similar
conflicts. While such a result might appear desirable, it would be disappointing if it
were accompanied by a slowing down of the normally more advanced integration of
* Translated from the French language by Mr. Jean-Aim6 Stoll, Officer of the Court's Translation

Service, Cour de Justice des Communaut&s Europ~nn'es.
"'Advocate General, Court of Justice of the European Communities, since x958. Formerly Advocate
General, European Coal and Steel Community, 1952-58. Contributor of articles to public law and
political science publications.
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the common market for coal and steel, and by a decrease of the powers of the

High Authority of the E.C.S.C.
However, at the time of writing,2 the Court has not had to pronounce itself on a
claim arising under the Treaties of RomeY Its role may, therefore, be studied only
within the framework of the Treaty concluded in Paris on April i8, i951, instituting
the E.C.S.C. In this respect, there exists no discontinuity between the Court of
Justice of the E.C.S.C. and the single Court of Justice that has been substituted
effective October 7, i958. With the exception of a few details, the rules of procedure
have remained unchanged, and the proceedings that had already been instituted
under the old Court have been processed without interruption under transitional
rules. Continuity has been the more easily ensured as four of the seven judges, as
well as the two advocates general and the registrar, have been transferred from the
old Court to the new.4
In fact, the number of cases has increased at a regular rate;5 and their number, as
well as the importance and variety of contested matters, have not only enabled the
Court to create its own case law, but also, through this case law, to exercise considerable influence on the development of the Community.

I
THE

CoueT'S ROLE AccoRING TO Tm PROVISIONS OF T=E TREATY

Article thirty-one of the E.C.S.C. Treaty establishes that
The function of the Court is to ensure the rule of law in the interpretation and application of the present Treaty and of its implementing regulations.
In order to understand the true role of the Court of Justice, its place in the network of institutions established by the Treaty must be ascertained. The Treaty
"A first interesting example of a confrontation of the two Treaties has arisen in an important case
dealing with transport rates (elimination of special rates applicable to the transport of coal for the steel
industry and of iron ore in the E.C.S.C.) In its two judgments of May to, 196o (Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Barbara Erzbergbau et al. v. High Authority, Dec. No. i9/58, 6/1
RECUEIL OFFICIEL DE JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR 469 (1960) [hereinafter cited as REc.]; Dec. Nos. 3/58
to 18/58, 25 & 26/58, 6/1 REc. 362 (196o)), the Court exclusively applied the E.C.S.C. rules on nondiscrimination and the rules governing the establishment of the Common Market based on the "most
rational distribution of production," which is obtained by the interplay of competition. It implicitly
refused to take account of considerations of "regional policies," whereas article 8o of the E.E.C. Treaty
provides that such factors must be considered for the authorization of special rates. In his final observations, the advocate general had advanced a rather more subtle argument, although he reached the
same conclusion as the Court. See notes 42-45 infra.
'July, 196o.
' With the exception of some conflicts in matters of staff relations.
'For this reason, the present study quotes judgments rendered by the Court of Justice of the E.C.S.C.
before Oct. 7, x958, and those rendered after this date by the new Court of Justice of the European
Communities without distinction. Judgments are cited with the record number of the Court's Record
office, the date, and the reference to the Recueil Officiel de iurisprudence de la Cour, published in Luxembourg.
r By July 15, ig6o, 154 appeals had been lodged, of which 2z8 had been withdrawn before judgment.
One hundred and six judgments had been rendered, 2o cases were pending on that date. Taking into
account the cases which represent interrelationships of a variable degree, one may estimate the number of
strictly distinct cases judged by the Court at about 50.
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,establishes a Community composed of the various Member States, whose clearly
,defined task is, first of all, the establishment of a common market for coal and steel.
To this effect, the Community6
must progressively establish conditions which will in themselves assure the most rational
,distribution of production at the highest possible level of productivity, while safeguarding
,the continuity of employment and avoiding the creation of fundamental and persistent
-disturbances in the economies of the Member States.

In order to meet these ends the Treaty defines its objects 7 and establishes proliubitive rules," as well as ways and means of action.9 Emphasis ought to be be laid
on the fact that these rules concern the Community as a whole-that is to say, each
of its institutions, and not only the High Authority.'0
Thus, the Court appears as an internal judicial organ, the activity of which,
-within the field of its competence, aims at the smooth functioning of the Community legal order, and which partakes of the life of the Community. In examining
the different aspects of the role of the Court in exercising the various powers
-conferred by the Treaty, this idea must constantly be kept in mind:
i. The main authority of the Court resides in its power to decide on claims for
-annulment, which Member States-and under certain conditions, coal and steelproducing enterprises (as well as interested third parties in certain cases)-may lodge
against decisions of the High Authority. The High Authority is, in fact, the
executive of the Community, and it is responsible for the application of the Treaty,
in that it must ensure the normal play of competition according to the rules laid
down by the Treaty, both by taking action adequate to attain Treaty objectives and
by resisting the violation of prohibitive rules by states as well as by enterprises. To
this end, the High Authority has been invested with certain powers, the exercise of
-which, from a formal as well as a material standpoint, has been carefully delimited
in each case; the High Authority acts by taking decisions, individual" or general,' 2
-or by creating administrative rules within the framework of powers delegated to it
by the TreatyP a In respect of these decisions, the Court, whenever they form the
:subject of an appeal, exercises a control over their legality-a control similar to that
0

E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 2.
rid. art. 3.

'id. art. 4.
"Id. arts. 5 and 6. The most important of these latter is the following: "The Community shall
=assure the establishment, the maintenance and the observance of normal conditions of competition, and
take direct action with respect to production and the operation of the market only when circumstances
make it absolutely necessary." This constitutes no less than the outline of the Community's economic
.:policy.
Pol. . . within the framework of their respective powers and responsibilities and in the common
interest, the institutions of the Community shall .... " E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 3.
"Authorization in matters of agreements and concentrations, see Nold v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. No.
i8/57, March 20, 1959, 5 RIEC 89 (1958-59).
22 Creation of a compensatory system, see Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen & Stahlindustrie Ct at. v.
Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 13/57, June 21, 1958, 4 REC. 286 (1958).
"E.g., regulation exempting certain concentrations from prior authorization, art. 66(3).
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of the municipal legal systems of Member States, of which the most commonly
known is the recours pour exc~s de pouvoir [appeal against abuse of power]
instituted before the Conseil d'Etat of France. As a matter of fact, claims for annulment may be instituted not only against positive decisions, but also against explicit
or implicit refusal of the High Authority, after suitable request, to make a decision
in cases where it is alleged that the High Authority, by virtue of the Treaty, was
under an obligation to act; this is known as recours en carence.
2. Apart from the jurisdiction to decide on claims for annulment, the Court
exercises in certain cases a "full jurisdiction"--i.e., an unlimited authority to consider
all the aspects of the case. The most important of these cases involves the sanctions
against enterprises and against Member States. The High Authority may impose
fines and daily penalty payments on enterprises alleged to have violated their obligations; and these enterprises may appeal to the Court, which has full powers to consider the case both in fact and in law; this includes the right to consider the amount
of the fine. A special procedure is provided where a Member State has violated one
of the obligations relating to the Treaty.' 4 This sanction applies equally to positive
acts, such as the grant of illicit subsidies or other means of assistance,' 5 and to
omissions, such as the nonexecution by a Government of a decision of the High
Authority during the course of an appeal.' 0 Here, again, the appeal en carence may
be resorted to: A Member State or an enterprise may request the High Authority to
declare that a Member State has violated one of its obligations, and go to the Court
if the High Authority refuses to act.' 7 As to questions both of fact and of law, proceedings instituted against a Member State under article eighty-eight for a failure
in fulfilling its Treaty obligations are of great importance. These proceedings
enable the Court to pass on questions that, in themselves, as well as in respect of the
principles to which they relate and the interpretation of the Treaty which they render
necessary, are of utmost significance. This is especially true since the application and
implementation of the Treaty often depends on action to be taken by the Member

States, rather than on the exercise of the High Authority's powers.
3. The Court is invested with additional powers-e.g.:
a. to decide on damages where the responsibility of the Community institutions
or their staff is involved;' 8
b. to decide on conflicts between the staff and the administration of the Com14

E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 88.

'E.g., creation by the Federal Government of a special allowance for underground miners subsidized
by the State, Association des Charbonnages R~unis du Limbourg, Dec. No. 17/57, Feb. 4, 1959, 5 REc. I

(1959).
" Decisions of the High Authority are rot suspended in effect prior to judgment when contested by
appeal, unless the Court orders their suspension; see E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 39; Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany v. High Authority, Dec. No. 3/59, March 8, z96o, 6/i Pc. 17 (196o).
"Groupement des Industries Sid&urgiques Luxembourgeoises v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. Nos. 7 and
9/54, April 23, 1956, 2 REC. 53 (1956).
's E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 40. Several claims for damages have been made on this basis by various steel
producers against the High Authority, for alleged faults in the control of the compensatory arrangement
for imported scrap iron, which has given rise to considerable fraud. One judgment has been rendered
F.E.R.A.M. v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 23/59, Dec. 17, 1959, 5 REc. 501 (1958-59).
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munities' institutions; the role of the Court in this respect is that of an
administrative tribunal similar to those instituted by the United Nations and
the International Labor Organization; 9
c. to annul the acts of the Assembly or the Council of Ministers at the request
of a Member State or the High Authority; this power is limited, however,
to claims founded on lack of legal competence or substantial procedural
violations and has not been exercised to date; and
d. to render an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of amendments to the
Treaty that the Assembly may propose under certain determined conditions, at the request of the High Authority and with the concurrence of
the Council of Ministers expressed by a majority of five members.2 0
This short summary of the Court's principal functions shows the twofold aspect
of its role:
i. On one hand, the Court is responsible for ensuring the legality-that is to say,

the conformance with the Treaty-of the action of the Community's organs, especially the executive and the Member States. To these latter, the Court represents a
guarantee against any arbitrary acts and abuse of power by the High Authority.
Conversely, it enables the High Authority to guard itself against interference by the
States or against their refusal to honor their pledge of cooperation in the application
of the Treaty. The functions of the Court in this regard can, therefore, be summarized as follows:
a. to ensure that the Community does not exceed the limits of the delegation
of sovereignty consented to by the Member States; and
b. to enable the Community to exercise the powers so delegated whenever
the States resist such exercise; if necessary, the Court may obligate the
Community to exercise its powers (the Court appears, therefore, to have
been invested with the functions of a constitutional court and, to the extent
that the Treaty may be assimilated to a federal system, it can be stated that
the role of the Court resembles closely that of a court exercising a federal
jurisdiction).
2. On the other hand, the Court is entrusted with the protection of individual
rights against the arbitrary and the illegal action of the Administration, and its role
in this respect is identical with the functions that the different Member States of
"' Fourteen judgments have already been rendered in this type of case, of which several are in favor
of the claimants. See e.g., Kergall v. Common Assembly, Dec. No. 1/55, July 19, 1955, 2 REC. xx
(1956), where the Court has elaborated a bold theory relating to the "prestatutory character" of a situation
founded on a "public law contract," which entitles employees to stability of employment; Miranda
Mirossewich v. High Authority, Dec. No. 10/55, Dec. 12, 1956, 2 Rae. 365 (z956), in which the Court
has annulled a decision refusing a permanent contract to a trainee, on account of the manner in which
the traineeship had been accomplished (following the judgment, the trainceship was renewed; and this
time the claimant was granted permanent appointment).
2oE.C.S.C. Treaty art. 95. This procedure has already once been applied, and has resulted in the
amendmen't of a very important Treaty clause, i.e., article 56, concerning grants-in-aid for the readaptation
of manpower rendered unnecessary by the structural changes of the coal market. Opinion of March 4,
xg6o, 6/ REc. 93 (I960).
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the Community have conferred on either administrative or regular tribunals. In
fact, the creation of the Treaty and the delegation to supranational organs (par-"
ticularly to the High Authority) of powers exercised hitherto by national authorities
has partly deprived certain citizens of the legal protection otherwise enjoyed in their
own countries: national judges are no longer competent to protect them. By ensuring that the supranational authorities exercise their powers in conformance with
the Treaty, the Court of Justice substitutes itself for the national judge in affording
the legal protection to which these citizens of the Member States continue to be
entitled, although certain jurisdiction has been transferred to the Community. This
is particularly true whenever the High Authority makes use of its right to impose
fines or to levy contributions by way of self-executing decisions that are not subject
to consideration by national judges. In this sense, it may be said that the legal order
of the Community, which represents the common weal of the Member States, incorporates itself into each municipal legal order; and the Court of Justice itself must
be considered, in each Member State, as the complement of the municipal judiciary.
II

How nm

COURT HAS INTERPRETED ITS FUNCTIONS

In the following discussion, it is intended to demonstrate how the Court has
exercised the functions conferred upon it by the Treaty. First, investigation will be
made of the conditions under which the Court has granted access to its forum to
claimants other than the States. Then inquiry must be made into the Court's contribution to the solution of some of the most important problems with which it has
had to deal.
A. The Direct Access to the Court by Private Individuals
From the beginning, it has become apparent that enterprises, associations of enterprises, and individuals freely instituted proceedings before the Court against-sometimes important-decisions of the High Authority. Proceedings instituted by Member States, however, remained rather the exception. What are the causes underlying
this situation?
The main cause of this phenomenon lies in the rather fortunate fact that conflicts
arising between the interests of one or more other Member States are rather infrequent, whereas the interests of different economic or social groups are more likely
to clash. A decision may be taken with the unanimous consent of Governments and
still seriously damage the interests of a whole trade or profession, such as the coal
producers. 2' Another reason is the increasing role assumed in fact by the Council

I "E.g., the appeal made by the Federation Charbonni~re de Belgique and a certain number of Belgian
coal industries against a decision of the High Authority concerning the distribution of funds made available under the compensatory arrangement (m&anisme de p&6quation) in order to enable the Belgian
coal industry to face the common market after the expiration of the transitional period. F dration
Charbonni~re de Belgique v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 8155, July 16, 1956, 2 Rac. 133 (1955-56);
Soci& des Charbonnages de Beeringen et al. v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 9/55, July 16, 1956, 2 REC.
323 (1955-56).
In his final observations, the undersigned Advocate General stated: "Associations of

LAw AND CON

OPRARY PIOBLEmS

of Ministers in the preparation of decisions by the High Authority. Even in the
normal case, where the concurring opinion of the Council is not required, these
decisions are generally preceded by extensive common research, or at least by consultations in close liaison with the Council or its Coordinating Committee-which is
composed of national civil servants responsible for preparing the sessions of the
Council, and which, although not provided for by the Treaty, plays, in fact, a very
important role. This procedure results frequently in an effective agreement among
the members of the Council, and between these latter as a body and the High
Authority. It goes without saying that a minister who has expressed his agreement
with a decision that, at least on the essential points, takes into account the concerns of
his own government, will, in most cases, hesitate, on behalf of this very same
government, to attack this decision on the very day of its publication. Under these
circumstances, the interested parties are left alone to defend themselves against
these "negotiated decisions," which, notwithstanding their thorough preparation, may
well turn out to be illegal. Thus, we have the paradox that the maintenance of
state influence within the Community in a larger proportion than was intended by
the Treaty calls for a more extensive direct protection of private individuals than
had been thought necessary.
The enterprises' right of appeal is rather strictly delimited by article thirty-three
of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. Thus, enterprises may only attack
individual decisions and recommendations affecting them, or ...general decisions and

recommendations which they deem to involve an abuse of power affecting them.
The state is considered responsible for the normal safeguarding of its nationals'
interests. This is a principle of international law that has been maintained in the
Treaty.
Experience has shown, however, that if the Treaty has revealed itself in respect
of the functioning of the executive to be somewhat less supranational than one
might have expected, it certainly is very supranational in regard to its direct intervention in the functioning of the Community's enterprises, the Community's
"subjects." In fact, whatever may be the circumstances in which the High Authority
takes its decisions, these are published in the Official Gazette and thereby become
self-executing. Hence the normal reaction of the victim is to go to Court; and hence
also the emphasis on the Court's role as the municipal judge-a role which has
already been underlined.
enterprises referred to by article 48 are called upon to play an important role under the Treaty, and
this role is defined by article 48 itself. We deem it absolutely necessary that they be allowed to play
this part also when it comes to defend in the law the collective interests which they represent, and this
all the more since-as experience proves-certain decisions of the High Authority may violate these
lawful interests, while n'oMember State deems it necessary to appeal. It may even be said, with regard
to coal, that such is almost the normal situation, because usually, and particularly in matters of prices,
the interests of the coal producers simultaneously conflict with those of the High Authority whose duty it
is to 'seek the establishment of the lowest possible prices' (art. 3(c)), with those of all the consumers,
particularly those of the steel producers, and with those of the Governments, whose general policy also
tends, in most cases, to reduce the prices of this raw material."
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This gives rise to inquiry about the Court's attitude with regard to this development. The question is whether the Court's attitude has been a rigid, negative one,
or whether, to the contrary, the Court, inspired exclusively by considerations of
equity, ignores the Treaty system and the legal principles which it contains. If
the Court had chosen the first solution, it would have been oblivious to the fact
that the chief task of a judge is to do justice, and that the Court is one of the
organs of the Community, which, by virtue of article three of the Treaty, are under
the obligation to realize the objectives laid down therein. In the second case,
the Court would have ignored its task, as defined by article thirty-one, to safeguard
the respect of law in the interpretation and the application of the Treaty.
Confronted with this dilemma, the Court has tried as far as possible to foster
an economic and political development which has become manifest, without, however, prejudicing the Treaty system, and without modifying the legal principles which
it contains. It is on this basis that the Court has tried to open its forum as much
as possible to private persons. It has been little inclined to attach undue importance
to rules of procedure, e.g., as regards the grounds of appeal 2 Likewise, it has not
been very demanding with regard to the grounds of decisions of the High
Authority,2 3 except in cases where it considered that clearly defined grounds were
necessary in order to allow the Court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by
the Treaty.2 4 Sometimes the Court has had recourse to literal interpretation: in
considering the tenor of article thirty-three (enterprises or their associations "shall
have a right of appeal against general decisions which they deem to involve an abuse
of power affecting them"), the Court declared that "according to this text, which is
perfectly clear, admissibility of the claim is sufficiently established if the claimant
'
formally alleges an abuse of power affecting him."25
The attitude of the Court is illustrated by another example concerning the
application of article thirty-three, which provides that enterprises and associations may
appeal "against individual decisions and recommendations concerning them." The
Court has decided that it is sufficient for the decision "to present the character of an
individual decision, although the decision may not be an individual one in respect of
the claimant," provided the latter is affected.
The Court referred in this case
"Compagnie
8

des hauts fourneaux de Chasse, Dec. No. 2/57, June 12, 1958, 4 REc. 146 (1958).
" Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v. High Authority, Dec. No. 6/54, Mar. 21,

x955, i REc. 2o

(1957).

(1954-55); Geitling v. Haute Autorit , Dec. No. 2/56, Mar. 2o, 1957, 3 REc. 36

"This goes for the application of art. 65(2), which lays down quite restrictively what are the
conditions under which agreements may be authorized. Nold v. Haute Autoriti, Dec. No. 18/58, Mar. 20,
1959, 5 REC. i6 (958-59); Comptoirs de ]a Ruhr ct Nold v. Haute Autorit4 Dec. Nos. 36-38/59 &
40/59, July 15, 196o, 6/2 REc. 852 (596o).

"Assider v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 3/54, Feb. 11, 1955, 1 Rac. 138 (1954-55).
"Groupement des Industries Sid&urgiques Luxembourgeoises v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. Nos. 7/54 and
9/54, 2 REc. 87 (1956). This was an appeal against an (implicit) decision of the High Authority in
refusing to take steps against the Government of Luxembourg for having authorized a public official to
increase the price of coal intended for other than household purposes-actually the coal exclusively used
by the steel industry, since the industrial uses of coal in Luxembourg are almost entirely limited to the
steel industry.
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to the principle of "interest" which, although not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty,

is the underlying principle of the claim for annulment, as the Advocates General
have noted on several occasions 2 Usually the Court has tried, whenever possible, to
hold itself to the text of the Treaty. However, in cases where the latter does not
furnish adequate grounds for standing to appeal, it does not hesitate to invoke the
Thus, the Court interprets a rigid and careful text on the
principle of "interest."
basis of general principles of municipal law of the Member States.
Consider another example of the Court's attitude. With regard to the formal
character of a decision, the Court has decided, in its judgments 2 relating to compensatory arrangements in Belgium, that a simple letter of the High Authority published in the "Information" section of the Official Gazette, must be considered
parte in qua as a decision liable to appeal. Still a further example: concerning the
objection of illegality, the Court has adjudged ° that, in view of the lacunae in the
texts directly applicable-and after rejecting the argument to the contrary which
might have been drawn from another Treaty rule (i.e., article thirty-six relating
to pecuniary sanctions, which provides expressis verbis the objection of illegality)the enterprises might, in the course of an appeal against an individual decision,
raise an objection of illegality as to those general decisions on which the attacked
decision had been based. Moreover, in this situation, they were authorized
to invoke against such general decisions all the grounds enumerated in article thirtythree and not merely the "abuse of power affecting them," which is the only ground
they would be allowed to invoke in case of a direct appeal. This decision is of
great importance, since, in effect and by way of exception, it confers the same
rights on the enterprises to contest the legality of the executive's decision as are
possessed by the Member States.
B. Study of Some Specific Cases
Having thus established that the Court has widely granted access to its forum,
and that the claimants have made an equally extensive use of this facility, it will be
interesting to demonstrate, by a few examples, how the case law of the Court has
been formed and the part such case law has played both in the creation of Treaty law
and in the development of the Community's activities.
i. The so-called "Price-List" case was the first case submitted to the Court.8l
Article sixty of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, dealing with prices, prohibits:
...discriminatory practices involving within the common market the application by a
" See Final Observations by Advocate General K. Roemer in Groupment des Industries Sid'rurgiques

Luxembourgeois v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. Nos. 7 & 9/54, April 23, 1956, 2 Ruc. 123-26 (1955-56).
Final Observations by Advocate General Lagrange in F~deration Charbonni~re de Belgique v. Haute
Autorit4
Dec. No. 8/55, July 16, 1956, 2 Rac. 267 (955-56).
"8 See the judgments already cited, supra note 26.
" See note 21 supra.

Compagnie des Hauts Fournaux de Chasse, Dec. No. 15/57, June 12, 1958, 4 Rtc. x86 (958);
Meroni, Case No. 9/56, June 13, 1958, 4 REc. 25 (1958).
"1 Government of the French Republic etal., cases i to 4/54, Dec. 21, 1954, I REc. zo (1954-55).
10
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seller of unequal conditions to comparable transactions, especially according to the nationality of the buyer.
and, in order to ensure this prohibition, establishes that
price-lists and conditions of sale applied by enterprises within the common market
shall be published to the extent and in the form prescribed by the High Authority.
...the

Originally the High Authority had, by way of administrative regulation, ordered
the publication of price lists and conditions of sale, and had prohibited the application of prices differing from those published; increases and decreases of prices had
to be preceded by appropriate and published amendments of the original or preceding price-list. However, the High Authority soon realized that steel producers
practiced, in fact, a discount policy which involved sometimes very important discrepancies between the actual price and the price-lists; this practice was motivated
by the economic recession which was prevailing in 1953. The High Authority could,
of course, have pronounced sanctions; but these would have had to be invoked
against practically all enterprises of the common market. In turn, this would undoubtedly have jeopardized the application and life of a Treaty which had hardly
begun to become a reality. On the other hand, if the violation by the enterprises
of the rules relating to publicity was subject to criticism, it actually reflected in a
better way the play of competition than would the artificial application of prices
higher than market prices. Thus, the High Authority searched for the means of
reconciling the application of the publicity rules, which it considered an essential
weapon to eliminate discrimination, with the maintenance of effective competition;
and, to this end, it allowed a 2/2 per cent tolerance in the application of the pricelists. This became known later as the "rabais Monnet" (Monnet's Discount). The
Court annulled this decision as being contrary to the Treaty; in doing so, it disagreed with the present writer who, as Advocate General, expressed the opinion
that the High Authority's interpretation of the Treaty might have some merit.
The importance of this first judgment of the Court is striking. From the outset
the Court has had to deal with one of the most delicate problems of market
economy, i.e., the relation between competition and nondiscrimination. From
this, certain commentators have drawn the conclusion that according to the Court's
interpretation of the Treaty, there exists a contradiction between the two principles
and that, in opposition to the E.E.C. Treaty, the Coal and Steel Treaty establishes the
priority of nondiscrimination over free competition?'2 This theory certainly does
not correspond to the intention of the authors of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, who have not
considered publicity of prices as an obstacle to the establishment of rules for normal
competition, but on the contrary, as a means towards achieving this end. In truth,
the problem relates rather to agreements, because, while it is relatively easy to
control the application of publicity rules, 33 it is much more difficult to detect and to
" This theory has been advocated, particularly at the important International Conference on AntiTrust Law, held in Frankfurt from June 7 to ii, i96o.
"The High Authority exercises a careful control on this subject and does not hesitate to apply
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eliminate agreements between producers if, for instance, all producers of one country
issue simultaneously price-lists which are similar. Moreover, the term "common
market" must not be considered as being synonymous with "single market"; there
can be no doubt that, even in the steel industry, 4 there remains a certain isolation
of national markets, despite the elimination of customs tariffs, quantitative restrictions, subsidies and other obstacles which have been abolished by the Treaty. In
fact, the potentialities of competition created by the Treaty, however active and beneficial they are, concern the several industries within the national territories, rather
than all enterprises of the six countries, each taken by itself.
The Court's judgment is no less instructive if it is considered from a purely legal
aspect. The Court had been confronted with one of the classic problems of treaty
interpretation-with a conflict between law and opportunity, rather than between
the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. It is interesting that the Court was not satisfied by a construction founded on a literal interpretation, but that it did use a
whole series of arguments in order to establish that the result at which it arrived was
the (probably regrettable) effect of a coherent system established by the Treaty and
logically inserted in its body of rules.
On a different and, with respect to a general analysis of the Treaty, probably
still more important issue, the Court stated that, in taking measures for the applicadon of specific Treaty rules (i.e., article sixty on prices) the High Authority is not
only entitled, but under obligation, to pursue the aims defined in the preliminary
articles two, three, and four (establishment of lowest prices, fight against illegal
agreements, etc.) and that article sixty on prices may be resorted to in order to sustain
action taken against agreements. Thus, from its very first judgment onwards,
the Court has been careful not merely to limit itself to a literal textual interpretation,
but instead to consider the Treaty as a whole and to recognize the interrelation
of the Treaty rules. This attitude has been of the utmost importance for the
application of an economic treaty, since it is self-evident that in this field a specific
problem may present itself in numerous aspects, each of which may be subject to
different legal norms.
2. This position was expressly reiterated in the next decision,35 in which the
Court considered that the existence of a situation which possibly justified the application of article 66(7) (predominant market position obtained by public or private
enterprises with the result of eliminating effective competition) did not itself bar
the High Authority from exercising the powers which article 6i (a) (establishment
of minimum prices) confers upon it.
sanctions to such enterprises as apply prices differing from their price-lists, or whose price-lists contain
omissions. See 1159, Macchiorlatti Dalmas e figli v Haute Autorit6, judgment of Dec. X7, 1959, 5 to.
415 (1959).
"'We do not even mention the coal industry, as to which it is common knowledge that the common
market is very far from being a reality.
"' Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dec. No. 6/54, March 21, 1955!,I PEc. 222 (1954-
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3. In connection with legal conflicts arising over scrap iron, two interesting
cases ought to be mentioned.
(a) The High Authority had created a financial arrangement for the supply
of scrap iron to the common market, in order to avoid the rise of prices of scrap
iron of internal origin in relation to those of scrap imported from third countries,
particularly the United StatesO6 The relevant decision had been taken pursuant
to article fifty-three of the Treaty, which reads as follows:
... the High Authority may:
(a) after consulting the Consultative Committee and the Council, authorize the
institution, under conditions which it shall determine and under its control, of any
financial mechanisms common to several enterprises which are deemed necessary for the
accomplishment of the missions defined in Article 3 • • • ;
(b) with the concurrence of the Council acting by unanimous vote, institute itself
any financial mechanism satisfying the same purposes as referred to above. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The High Authority had applied the last rule, which rendered the financial arrangement obligatory. The management of this arrangement had been entrusted to a
private body established by the major steel producers of the Community, whose
decisions, provided they were taken unanimously, were final. The High Authority
retained merely the right to veto. However, some of these decisions, such as the
establishment of the compensatory price, clearly exceeded the powers of management
and, through the exercise of prerogatives clearly reserved to the High Authority,
constituted an authentic market intervention. The mere failure to veto cannot
be considered as being equivalent to a decision taken by the High Authority as a
collective body in conformance with the procedure prescribed, and under the safeguards established by the Treaty.
Consequently, the Court has rejected the above procedure on the grounds that it
37
This
entails a delegation of powers by the High Authority to a private body.
dirigisme,
of
professional
rejection
decision, which from many viewpoints appears as a
has in this respect drawn due attention from all concerned within the Community.
Lawyers will appreciate this judgment in view of the important contribution to legal
science by a decision which, in applying to the Community a theory about the
delegation of powers, influences directly the balance of powers established by the
Treaty, and, in so doing, touches on the very scope and conditions of delegation of
the powers underlying the Coal and Steel Community. The problem is truly one of
federal constitutionallaw, and this appears with particular clarity if account is taken
of the fact that it is a private person, a subject of the Community as well as of a
Member State, which receives the safeguard of rules created for the benefit of these
"*As had been expected, the entry into force of the common market created a certain strain on
the internal scrap iron market, particularly in Italy, which has no ore mines and has been traditionally
a great consumer of scrap iron. Supplies used to be imported freely into Italy from France and Germany,
but their resources, formerly in excess of demand, became insufficient. From 1955 onwards, the situation
became disquieting because of the considerable increase of the "composite price" of American scrap iron.
For some time now, the strain has lessened. The compensatory arrangement has not been extended and is
at present being liquidated.
S Meroni v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. No. 9/56, June 13, 1958, 4 Rac. 36 (r958).
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"double allegiance" subjects-rules which trace the limits of the power of the "Federal
Executive" and lay down the conditions under which it may be exercised.
(b) The second case touches on the substance of the matter. In a first phase, the
problem was one of a "simple compensation" between imported scrap iron prices
and prices of "internal" scrap iron; compensation was paid on a quantitative pro rata
basis. It soon turned out, however, that the moderate prices which were the result
of the arrangement expanded, rather than decreased, the demand for this scarce raw
material. The very effect of compensation turned out to render the normal functioning of the price mechanism impossible.
Hence came the plan to modify the arrangement, so as to encourage the economizing of scrap iron "without, however, rendering the establishment of new steelproducing centers more difficult." This was obtained by modifying the criterion for
distribution of the compensatory funds; these were no longer to be distributed on a
tonnage pro rata basis, but in an unequal manner, which tended to penalize use of
scrap iron deemed excessive in relation to a determined period of reference. The
purpose was to obtain an increase in the consumption of pig iron. This modified
arrangement was at the heart of a series of appeals introduced by the Belgian,
German, and French steel industries.
These appeals were principally based on the following grounds:
i. Violation of article three, particularly as regards the Community's obligation
to:
(c) seek the establishment of the lowest possible prices,
(d) ensure that conditions are maintained which will encourage enterprises to expand
and improve their ability to produce.
The above rules were invoked in the first place by steelworkers using the Martin
and electrical processes, since, to them, scrap iron practically represents the sole
raw material which can be used. The High Authority did not fail in their reply to
invoke other goals equally established by article three-for example, the goal which
obligates the Community "to promote a policy of rational development of natural
resources, while avoiding undue exhaustion of such resources." This rule, mutatis
mutandis, may be so construed as to apply to scrap iron-which, to the steel producer, is as much a raw material as is iron ore.
2. Discrimination.
3- Violation of certain specific rules, particularly article fifty-eight, on shortages.

In this respect, the High Authority was criticized for having used a financial arrangement (relevant under article 53 (b)) in order to correct a shortage (whereas this
situation was deemed covered by article fifty-nine); avoiding thereby the ad hoe
procedure; and, by so doing, depriving the enterprises of the safeguards provided
for by this article (which may be defined as a sort of "procedural abuse").
The Court approved the High Authority's decision and declared :38
8 See Groupement des Hauts Fourn'eaux et Aci&ies Beiges et al., Dec. Nos. 8 to 13/57, June 21,
4 ReC. 223 (1958). (Emphasis supplied.)
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In pursuing the aims of article three of the Treaty, the High Authority must, in
eventual conflicts, ensure permanent conciliation between these aims considered individually and, whenever such conciliation is impossible, grant a temporary preference to
such aims as may appear appropriate in the light of facts or economic circumstances in view
of which the High Authority, when carrying out the task assigned by article eight of the
Treaty, takes its decisions.

After determining the meaning of the term "financial arrangement" in the
wording of article fifty-three, the Court continued:
...
whereas the High Authority may, by making appropriate use of this powerful means
of intervention, ensure to a very great extent, subject to the. needs of the situation, the
necessary conciliation of the aims of article three of the Treaty within the framework
of the task assigned to it by the Treaty, and whereas conversely the powers delegated
to this end to the High Authority are limited by specific rules contained in Title III of
the Treaty; whereas, in particular, such powers must be considered to have. been used for
illegal ends if it appears that the High Authority has used them exclusively, or at least
chiefly for the purpose of avoiding a procedure.specifically laid down by the Treaty in
order to meet the situation with which it has to deal ....

Thus, the Court rendered an exhaustive interpretation of one of the Treaty's
basic articles (article three) and to this end used the concept of reconciling legal
goals whose concurrent application creates conflicts. Thus was employed one of the
most efficient tools of administrative tribunals;"9 and only thereafter has the Court
searched for the legal source of the power conferred on the High Authority for such
purposes. Finally, the Court undertook to set the limits of this power by using a
conception of legal technique well known to the specialist-i.e., the "dtournement
de procedure."
This case illustrates the role of the Court, not in its capacity of "economic judge,"
but as an administrative tribunal deciding in economic matters. The Court does
not choose between laissez-faire liberalism and dirigisme; it does not create a doctrine. By interpreting the Treaty in a coherent manner, and by construing it so as
to enable the Executive to attain the aims of the Community, the Court limits its
role to that of ensuring that the different Community institutions exercise their
powers in accord with the Treaty.
4. One last example will be gleaned from some very recent cases on transport
matters. The difficulty in this field stems from the fact that the Coal and Steel
Treaty realizes merely partial integration of coal and steel. The transport pool,
which had been envisaged at the same time as the Schuman Plan, has not been translated into reality. The Treaty merely provides for a limited intervention by the
High Authority, and leaves the task of eliminating discriminations in the transport
of coal and steel, as well as that of harmonizing transport rates, to the Governmentswhich, moreover, in all other matters pertaining to general transport policy, retain
"' One of the classic examples of the application of this theory may be found in the case law of the
French Conseil d'Etat, concerning the reconciliation of the powers of police with the protection of individual rights.
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their unfettered sovereignty. Thus it is within the framework of the E.E.C. Treaty
that the general transport problem will have to be solved. The sole direct power
conferred on the E.C.S.C. High Authority concerns special freight rates created
for the benefit of coal and steel producers; and these rates must be submitted to the
High Authority for approval. In all other matters, the role of the High Authority is
limited to that of coordinating and possibly of discerning discriminations; but it
does not include the power of imposing a rate system on Member States. Nevertheless, due to the efforts of a Committee composed of experts from the six Member
States and inspired by the High Authority, substantial results at first were achieved
in the elimination of discriminations within national systems and in the establishment of direct international rates of a digressive character and exempt from the usual
procedure of "breaking" the rates on crossing national boundaries.
However, with regard to special domestic rates for transport of ore and coal by
rail to the steel industry, the High Authority was less fortunate. After extended
exchanges of opinion with the interested Governments and after investigations on the
spot, a series of decisions were made on February 9, 1958, ordering the suppression
of all rates considered as "supporting rates," while approving at the same time the
maintenance of a certain number of other rates, justified by different reasons, such
as the existence of competing means of transport. According to the High Authority,
the reasonable solution would have consisted in establishing in Germany special rates
for whole trains, as had already been done in France and in Belgium; but the High
Authority did not have the power of imposing this solution on the German Government and could only "recommend" it- to no avail. 4 °
The decision concerning German rates was appealed by the West German Government, seconded by the interested Linder, as well as by a whole series of German
steel producers who had benefited from the suppressed special rates. On the other
hand, the decision was supported by the steel producers of Lorraine, supported by the
French Government. The Lorraine steel producers argued that, in reality, the
special rates of the German Bundesbahn constituted, in toto, a discriminating rate
system, since, in fact, the transport of coal from the Ruhr to Lorraine was subjected
to the general rates0 1 On the other hand, the Germans protested against the
abolition of certain special rates, because they were persuaded that these rates were
justified for particular reasons.
42
This conflict has given rise to several important judgments. First it was ruled
that the course of action taken by the German Government in refusing to execute the
decisions of the High Authority until judgment in this case had been rendered was
"'It is known that the Bundesbahn-the German rail system-is not autonomous in matters of
transport rates; these must be approved by the federal government. Traditionally, the "freight rates
policy" has been an instrument of the government in the service of the latter's general economic policy;
it has been used particularly to assist certain industries situated in economically disadvantaged regions,
such as Siegerland.
"It is common knowledge that the steel industry of Lorraine, situated nearby the iron ore reserves
of Lorraine, depends largely on the Ruhr for its supplies of coke.
"Government of the Federal Republic of Germany v. High Authority, Dec. No. 3/59, Mar. 8, 196o,
6 REc. 117 (196o).
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illegal!' The Court stated that the decisions of the High Authority take effect even
as to Member States, unless and until the Court has ordered the execution of thedecision to be suspended. On the merits, the appeals were rejected. The Court.
declared that "it would be contrary to the spirit of the Treaty to authorize special
rates on the sole ground that adaptation of the interested enterprises to the common,
market appeared difficult or impossible."44 This implied the rejection of theso-called "supporting" rates. It also entailed the implicit rejection of "regionalism"'
within the framework of the Coal and Steel Treaty. Special rates cannot be justified except in special circumstances, for reasons inherent in the transport enterprises
themselves, such as established competition by other means of transport like water
transport (this did apply to certain rates).
Those judgments are interesting not only from the legal standpoint, but also,
because of their consequences. In fact, the federal government did not await thejudgment in re Sid~rurgielorraine4" in order to study a system of rates by wholetrains; at the time of writing, these rates are about to be introduced and will grant
substantial reductions applicable without any discriminations whatsoever as to anytransport of coal to the steel producers, including those situated in Lorraine. This
"Government of the Federal Republic of Germany v. High Authority, Dec. No. 19/58, May Io,.
x96o, 6/I REc. 469 (196o); Barbara Erzbergbau et al. v. Haute Autorit6, Dec. Nos. 3-18/58, 25 te
26/58, May io, 196o, 6/i REc. 367 (ig6o).

4"For his part, the present writer stated, in his final observations (6/i Rac. 441 (ig6o)): "One of'
the basic principles which, in the minds of the authors of the Treaty, condition the common market is
that of equality under 'natural' conditions, and particularly of maintaining what has been called,
'geographic protection.' Here we meet with the fundamental error committed by most of the claimants
who base their reasoning on the assumption that transport rates could-or eved must-consider the location
of enterprises, as a determining factor, and adapt themselves accordingly. But, in our opinion, theopposite is true; the transport is the determining factor to which enterprises must adapt themselves,
and transport must be so organized as not to be discriminating, the suppression of discriminations may
eventually entail structural changes and relocation of production units; it being understood that all
necessary steps will be taken to minimize the more violent effects of such relocation. This is the condition
to which the Treaty subjects the task of progressively establishing 'conditions which will in themselves.
assure the most rational distribution of production at the highest possible level of productivity' (art. 2),.
that is to say, an effective common market of raw materials proportionate to Europe."
" While admitting that neither the High Authority nor the Court is in a position to judge theeconomic soundness of a Member State's regional policy, the Advocate General expressed the opinion
that a "supporting" rate might perhaps be justified, from the carrier's point of view, in cases where, im
consideration of other existing measures of regional assistance, this rate represented a temporary measureof assistance which was supposed to disappear on the day the regional policy had obtained results and
enterprises would be in a position to accept application of normal rates. Thus, the special rate would haveto be considered as a measure justified to preserve customers which might turn out to raise the cost of'
transport above marginal levels, and could not, in this case, be considered as a subsidy prohibited by the
Treaty, or as a discrimination. However, in the case referred to, the above conditions had not been met-,
either because of failure on the part of the enterprises to prove that they were not in a position to pay
normal rates (transport of coal from the Ruhr to the Siegerland industries) or because the need forassistance was of a permanent character (transport of iron ore).
" The judgment was read in public sittings on July 15, x96o. As had been expected after thejudgment of May io, on the German claims, the main argument of Siderurgielorraine has been rejected.
The suppression of unauthorized special rates has resulted in the greater part of the internal German
traffic being subject to the basic rate which hence becomes in fact, and not merely in law, a general ratewithout discriminating character. Claimants have nevertheless obtained partial satisfaction since the Court:
admitted, after hearing the experts, that certain rates aimed at competition with fluvial transport had notbeen correctly computed. (Chambre syndicale de ]a noterurgie de PEst de la France et al. v. HauteAutorit., Dec. Nos. 26 & 36/58, 6/2 REC. 573 (196o).)
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solution had at all times been championed by the High Authority, which could,
however, not impose it. Thus, a problem has been solved in a field where the powers
of the High Authority are especially limited-a problem in regard to which responsible governments, due to the divided opinions of their experts, had always
been powerless.
CONCLUSION

The few cases discussed above can give only an incomplete idea of the role
played in fact by the Court in the functioning of the Community, as compared to the
role assigned to it by the Treaty. Nevertheless, one striking fact stands out quite
clearly: The Court's role has undoubtedly been more important than had been
foreseen; and, above all, it has been considerably different from that which had been
visualized originally.
The authors of the Treaty conceived of the Court of Justice as the guardian of
legality in the application of the Treaty, according to Western European concepts.
According to these concepts, it belongs to the High Authority as the Executive

responsible to a Parliamentary Assembly, to take the initiative and select the means
by which to attain the aims of the Treaty. To this end, the Executive has been
invested with considerable power. As a corollary of this, however, it is for the
judge to ensure that this power is exercised within the limits laid down by the
Treaty. Among the different tasks of the Court which have been outlined in the
introductory part of this paper, the most important, according to the spirit of the
Treaty, was most certainly the task of safeguarding Member States and enterprises
against possible abuse of power on the part of the High Authority.
As a general rule, experience shows, however, that the only criticism that could
possibly be leveled against the High Authority would not be that of having abused
its power, but rather that of not having, in numerous cases, exercised its power with
sufficient determination nor with sufficient promptness. In truth, the High Authority
has not always been responsible for this situation; for instance, during 1959, the
Council of Ministers did refuse its concurring opinion-required by article fiftyeight-for the introduction of production quotas, which the High Authority deemed
to be temporarily required to face the coal crisis. It has, nevertheless, been excessively
timid in cases where its powers obviously existed. Thus, in making its decisions relating to the compensatory arrangement introduced to enable Belgian coal mining
to face the situation resulting from the common market created after the transitional
five year period, the High Authority has not dared to lay down sufficiently selective
criteria so as to concentrate efforts on those mines which were the most likely to
become competitive ones with the aid of financial assistance. The Court has been
led to admit implicitly that such a selective policy would not have been illegal.47
Evidently, the failure-now generally acknowledged-to integrate the Belgian coal
industry into the common market during the transitional period has contributed to
""Doc.Nos. 8/55, 9/55, Nov. 29, 1956, 2 REc. 29i-325 (1955-56).
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the universal proportions of today's coal crisis, which has become a problem affecting
the very structure of the economy. The Belgian coal problem is rendered more

difficult to solve because the High Authority is now no longer entitled to use the
exceptional measures which were at its disposal during the transitional period.
A further example to illustrate the insufficiently vigorous and speedy application

of Treaty rules may be taken from the coal industry in connection with the problem
of organizing collective sales groups of coal from the Ruhr and ensuring that such
groups conform to the Treaty's anti-trust legislation.4 s Since the Treaty entered into
force, no satisfactory solution for this problem has been found; and this has enabled

the interested groups to consolidate their position. It goes without saying that today,
in the midst of a general coal crisis, solution of the problem has not become any
easier.49

This state of affairs is in part explained by the influence of the Council of Ministers on decisions of the High Authority which, as has already been set out,50 is
greater than had been provided for by the Treaty. In addition to the influence of
states which is thus manifested through the Council, the influence of powerful professional "pressure groups"--whose aims concern practical results, rather than the
orthodox application of the Treaty-makes itself felt. However, the consequence of
this development has been the increasing importance of the role played by the Court
of Justice. The latter is responsible for the correct application of the Treaty and
may not ignore the principles and rules which it contains. This fact only increases.
its responsibility for the functioning of the Community; and there are voices which
talk of the prospect of a "Government by Magistrates." Doubtless, this would be far-

fetched. For our part, we believe that, whatever may be the Court's desire to take
account of economic and political reality and to foster a harmonious development of
the Community, the Court cannot neglect its basic duty, which is that of defending
the Treaty. As a judge of legality, it has no other choice but to leave the responsi-

bility for its own actions to the High Authority, and to leave it to the governments
to decide on such amendments to the Treaty as they may deem necessary.
,8 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 65.
" It ought not to be forgotten that the Court is called in only a posteriori and if a case has been
submitted to it. Despite its endeavor, as we have seen, to open its forum in the largest possible way, it
sometimes happens that essential issues are not submitted to it or that they are submitted in a more or
less incidental way, which does not allow for a judgment on the very merits of the case. This is what
happened in the case of the organization for the common sale of Ruhr coal. On this matter, several
interesting cases were submitted to the Court, but the only one which would have really allowed for a
well-timed judgment on the main issue was withdrawn before judgment. This appeal had been lodged
by Italian steel producers, but after being granted some satisfaction by the organizations involved, they
withdrew their action. Ansaldo Coke et al. v. Haute Autorit6, case filed under No. 4/56. The appeal
had been lodged against the High Authority's decision of Feb. 15, 1956, authorizing the sale in common
of Ruhr coal by three sale agencies, under supervision of a common board; that decision still underlies the
actual organization. Certainly, the Court alone cannot secure the Treaty's enforcement against an actualagreement of the High Authority, of the Governments, and of the enterprises.
0

See II(A) supra.

